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Abstract. 
In Western Europe and the US, the last couple of decades have witnessed a large 
increase in the new forms of marriages, usually called quasi-marriages, like 
cohabitation. Today in many European countries more than 15% of all couples are 
cohabiting. Furthermore, cohabiting couples differ from married ones. They tend to 
share household tasks and market works more equally than married couples. The aim of 
this paper is to account for the rise in cohabitation as well as the cross-sectional 
differences between cohabiting and married couples. To this end, we build a two-period 
model of marriage and cohabitation with home production. Using this framework, we 
analyze, both theoretically and empirically, the effects of the narrowing of the gender 
wage gap and the improvement in household production technology on the agents’ 
marital decisions. 
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1 Introduction
Family and household structure changed drastically in the last couple of
decades. The marriage rate has declined sharply resulting in a shift in the com-
position of population by marital status towards never married. In the US divorce
rates rose, doubling between the mid-60s and mid-70s. The divorce rate has also
increased more recently in many European countries like Italy, France, Germany,
and Spain.
At the same period, the basic institution of marriage also underwent a big
change. People have turned to more exible forms of union. The decision to
form a household with another person has been decoupled from the decision
to marry, and quasi marriages have emerged as a new institution. In some
countries cohabiting couples have the possibility to enter formal registration that
will provide them with a virtually equivalent legal status to that of married
couples (with some possible exceptions). Some examples of more formal types of
quasi marriage are registered partnership in Belgium and pacte civile de solidarité
in France. In most countries though, informal cohabitation is the only available
form of quasi marriage. Both formal and informal cohabitation can be dissolved
easily with minor costs and their dissolution rate is higher than the divorce rate
(see Pison, 2008 for pacte civile de solidarité in France and Bumpass and Lu,
1989 and 2000 for informal cohabitation in the US).
But what factors are behind the shift towards quasi marriages? One possible
factor is the dramatic increase in female labor force participation over the past
decades. The increase started earlier in some countries (e.g. the US and the
Scandinavian countries) but spread to the most of the OECD countries. In
2001 the participation rates of prime-age women range from less than 50% in
many Southern European countries to well above 70% in Scandinavian, Central
European countries, and the US (Jaumotte, 2003).
There is a large literature that studies the changes in female labor supply.
Among possible factors one can list the di¤usion of the contraceptive pill (Goldin
and Katz, 2002), the narrowing of the gender wage gap (Jones et al., 2003),
the cultural transmission of gender roles from mothers to sons (Fernández et al,
2004), and the improvement in the household production technology (Greenwood
et al., 2005). More recently, Kaygusuz (forthcoming) has emphasized the role of
tax reforms, while Albanesi and Olivetti (2009b) have proposed medical progress
as a potential factor. In this paper we focus on the narrowing of the gender wage
gap and the improvement in the household production technology. These two
factors may also a¤ect agentsincentives to get married. The narrowing of the
gender wage gap increases womens bargaining power and reduces the value to
specialization within marriage. Improvements in household technology lead to a
further decrease in the returns to specialization, and in the opportunity cost of
not getting married (Greenwood and Guner, 2009).
The question we try to investigate is the e¤ect of the narrowing of the gender
wage gap and the improvement in household production technology on the rise of
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cohabitation. The basic idea is as follows: In the past most women did not work,
or earned less than men. Hence, marriage, which was more di¢ cult to break than
cohabitation due to the legal costs involved, was an attractive option for women
(Becker, 1993). Men on the other hand were depending on women because of
house work. Household production technology was not very progressed and it
required a lot of time. Hence, a man would get married to a woman so as to use
her time in house work and devote his own time to market work (specialization).
Nowadays the conditions have changed. The gender wage gap has narrowed
and household production technology has improved, weakening the incentives to
enter a "secure" union for both men and women.
The idea that the agentsmarital decisions are a¤ected by economic reasons
goes back to Becker (1993). According to Becker the major cause of the changes
of the family was the growth in the earning power of women as the American
economy developed. Cohabitation is also a part of the change. Oppenheimer
(1994) instead, argues that it is the deterioration of young mens earnings that
caused the increase in cohabitation.
The recent economic literature has proposed other possible causes of cohab-
itation. Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) report as possible driving forces the di-
minishing social stigma, and the lower value of formal marriage (through the
unilateral divorce laws and marriage tax penalty on secondary earners). Social
stigma though, can be endogenous. In this case, technological changes may as
well a¤ect its evolution in time. Taxes could play a role with the tax penalty
acting as an enhancing factor for cohabitation. Chade and Ventura (2005) de-
velop a search model with di¤erential tax treatment of married and single people
in the US. They also extend their model to include cohabitation. In their study
cohabitors are taxed individually, as if they were single. However, it is worth
noticing that in Nordic countries and the US the tax penalty on secondary earn-
ers has decreased during the last decades (Jaumotte, 2003). In the same period
in the US the rate of cohabitation has doubled. In Italy and Spain, where the tax
penalty has increased substantially, cohabiting couples are still a small minor-
ity (less than 5%). Lastly, there are countries like France and the Netherlands
where cohabiting couples have the possibility of registering and therefore facing
the same tax penalty as married couples.
The existing literature takes di¤erent paths to model the di¤erences between
marriage and cohabitation. Drewianka (2004 and 2006) attributes the di¤erence
in the level of commitment, while Cigno (2007), Wydick (2007), and Matoushek
and Rasul (2008) adopt a game-theoretical framework where cohabitation arises
as a non cooperative equilibrium and marriage as a cooperative one. In Cignos
(2007) framework, the equilibrium in the cooperative game is reached by Nash-
bargaining while equilibrium in the non-cooperative game is Cournot-Nash and
each party takes the other partys actions as given. Matoushek and Rasul (2008)
show that marriage serves as a commitment device that fosters cooperation in an
innitely repeated prisoners dilemma. In our setting cohabitation di¤ers from
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marriage with respect to the probability and the cost of dissolution.
The transition from cohabitation to marriage has also been a matter of in-
terest. Brien et al (2006) study cohabitation, marriage and divorce in the US
using a model of learning of match quality. They perform quantitative analysis
and show that cohabiting unions have higher dissolution probability than mar-
riages and marriages that are proceeded by cohabitation are less likely to last
(selection e¤ect). We treat cohabitation as a substitute and not as a precursor
to marriage, i.e. we abstract from transitions into marriage. Moreover, the need
to learn the match quality is unlikely to explain why cohabitation has become
common nowadays although it was rare in the past. Gemici and Laufer (2010)
study the ine¢ ciencies that might arise in cohabitation due to the lack of com-
mitment. Using a model with household production technology they perform
policy experiments, and assess the welfare implications of di¤erent institutional
arrangements regarding divorce regulations.
There is also an empirical literature examining the factors that caused the in-
crease in cohabitation. Kalmjin (2007) uses cross-sectional data for 27 countries
in the mid 1990s and nds that female labor force participation as well as the
percentage of the population with tertiary education a¤ects positively cohabita-
tion. The unemployment rate decreases cohabitation, while church membership
does not have any statistically signicant e¤ect. Wydick (2007) also nds that
female labor force participation increased cohabitation using data for the 50
states of the US in 1990 and 2000. In some specications religion also seemed to
play a signicant negative role. The divorce rate, the mandated health insurance
coverage of the contraception pill, as well as per capita abortions do not have
any signicant e¤ect.
Our variables of interest, i.e. the gender wage gap and the improvement of
household production technology are two of the factors that have been identied
behind the increase in female employment. Greenwood et al (2005) study the
e¤ect of the new household production technology (through the declining prices
and wider availability of home appliances) on female labor force participation.
This e¤ect is assessed empirically by Cavalcanti and Tavares (2008) using data
for 17 OECD countries between the years 1975-1999. Their ndings suggest that
a decrease in the relative price of home appliances leads to a substantial and
statistically signicant increase in female labor force participation. Jones et al.
(2003) nd instead that it is the gender wage gap what drives the increase in
female employment. The primer goal of these studies is to examine the factors
behind female employment and they therefore treat marital decisions as exoge-
nous without making any distinction between marriage and cohabitation. We
endogenize the marital decision and we include cohabitation as an extra marital
institution.
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2 Motivation
2.1 Cohabitation, Marriage Rate and Marital Status of
the Population
Cohabitation has risen sharply during the last decade. Cohabitants as a
percentage of all couples have doubled in the US during the last 20 years (Current
Population Survey). The rate of cohabitation is nowadays around 20% or above
in many European countries like Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands,
Norway, and Sweden (Table 1).
Cohabitation serves either as a precursor or as a substitute for marriage. In
the US, although most cohabitations do not end in marriage, most marriages
are preceded by cohabitation (National Survey of Family Growth, 2002). Fur-
thermore, one fth of the cohabitations in the US in 2002 last more than 5
years, indicating that cohabitation can be permanent, and thus a substitute for
marriage (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007a).
Table 1
% change
Austria 1997 9.11 2007 15.35 68.50
Belgium 2007 11.10 NA
Denmark 1996 24.81 2006 24.37 -1.77
Finland 1995 18.49 2007 24.19 30.83
France 1995 14.58 2004 19.61 34.50
Germany 1996 8.52 2005 11.71 37.44
Ireland 1995 4.67 2006 14.14 202.78
Italy 1995 3.08 2006 4.47 45.13
Netherlands 1996 13.88 2008 19.25 38.69
Norway 2008 22.44 NA
Spain 2005 4.26 NA
Sweden 1995 23.35 2005 26.82 14.86
UK 1996 10.00 2006 15.99 59.90
US 1996 5.07 2008 10.43 105.72
Source: See Appendix
Cohabiting couples as percentage of all couples
1990's 2000's
At the same time, the marriage rate has decreased substantially in many
countries (Table 2). The crude marriage rate, i.e., the ratio of the number of
marriages during the year to the average population in that year, has fallen more
than 17% in Austria, France, Italy, the Netherlands, UK, and the US. Tables 1
and 2 indicate that more couples decide to cohabit instead of getting married.
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Table 2
Crude marriage rate (per 1000 inhabitants)
1990's 2000's % change
Austria 1995 5.40 2007 4.33 -19.81
Belgium 1995 5.07 2007 4.29 -15.38
Denmark 1995 6.64 2007 6.70 0.90
Finland 1995 4.65 2007 5.58 20.00
France 1995 9.10 2007 4.30 -52.75
Germany 1995 5.27 2007 4.48 -14.99
Ireland 1995 4.32 2007 5.17 19.68
Italy 1995 5.10 2007 4.21 -17.45
Netherlands 1995 5.27 2007 4.34 -17.65
Norway 1995 4.97 2007 4.98 0.20
Spain 1995 5.10 2007 4.47 -12.35
Sweden 1995 3.81 2007 5.24 37.53
UK 1995 5.55 2007 4.43 -20.18
US 1995 8.90 2007 7.30 -17.98
Sources: National Vital Statistics (US) and Eurostat
The changes in the cohabitation and marriage rate are reected in the com-
position of the population by marital status (Tables 3 and 4). The married male
and female population have decreased in all countries, while the divorced and
never married population have risen. Sweden and France have experienced the
biggest drop in the percentage of married population, and nowadays more than
half of the population is not married. In the US 10% of the population is di-
vorced. In Italy, on the other hand, although divorced people are still a minority,
they have doubled during the last decade.
Table 3 Table 4
Country Marital Status 1993 2003 % Change
% married 60,0 57,2 -4,7
% never married 30,3 32,1 5,9
% divorced 7,1 8,2 15,5
% married 60,7 55,3 -8,9
% never married 31,3 34,6 10,5
% divorced 5,0 6,9 38,0
% married 56,2 50,9 -9,4
% never married 34,5 37,8 9,6
% divorced 4,3 6,0 39,5
% married 62,0 61,6 -0,6
% never married 34,0 34,3 0,9
% divorced 0,7 1,2 71,4
% married 57,9 54,5 -5,9
% never married 34,7 36,6 5,5
% divorced 4,8 6,3 31,3
% married 48,5 43,1 -11,1
% never married 40,1 44,0 9,7
% divorced 8,1 10,0 23,5
Sources:
United States: U.S. Census Bureau
Marital Status of Male Population, 15 Years Old and Over
in Percentages
Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, and Sweden: generated from Eurostat
US
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
France
Sweden
Country Marital Status 1993 2003 % Change
% married 56,4 54,0 -4,3
% never married 22,9 25,3 10,5
% divorced 9,6 10,9 13,5
% married 55,4 52,0 -6,1
% never married 22,7 26,0 14,5
% divorced 6,1 7,9 29,5
% married 51,3 46,5 -9,4
% never married 27,5 30,8 12,0
% divorced 5,6 7,5 33,9
% married 57,7 57,2 -0,9
% never married 26,4 26,2 -0,8
% divorced 1,0 1,7 70,0
% married 55,6 52,5 -5,6
% never married 27,1 28,9 6,6
% divorced 6,0 7,9 31,7
% married 46,7 41,7 -10,7
% never married 30,9 34,8 12,6
% divorced 9,8 12,2 24,5
Sources:
United States: U.S. Census Bureau
Marital Status of Female Population, 15 Years Old and Over
in Percentages
US
Germany
France
Italy
Netherlands
Sweden
Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, and Sweden: generated from Eurostat
2.2 Cross-country evidence
There are scarce data on cohabitation. In the case of the US an appropriate
estimate of cohabitation is available only after 1996. Before 1996 the estimates
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of unmarried couples also included households that had two unmarried adults of
the opposite sex without identifying themselves as unmarried partners (Casper et
al, 1999). United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) provides
some data on cohabitation but only for a few countries and years. We gathered
our sample from the National Statistical Services of each country as well as from
UNECE. We constructed the rate of cohabitation as the number of cohabiting
couples divided by the number of all couples.
Surprisingly, data on the gender wage gap is also di¢ cult to nd. Most data
on wages are collected from rm surveys without making any distinction with
respect to the gender of the employees. We constructed the gender wage gap
as the di¤erence of average male and female earnings divided by average male
earnings using data from Eurostat, OECD and UNECE.
The relative price of home appliances is the price of home appliances as a ratio
of CPI. Data are available from Eurostat for all years after 1995. This variable
has been used in other studies (Cavalcanti and Tavares, 2008) as an indicator of
household production technology. Our complete dataset is an unbalanced panel
for 15 OECD countries in the period 1990-2008.
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Figure 1
In Figure 1 we plot the change in the gender wage gap and the change in
the rate of cohabitation during the last decade for a group of countries in our
sample.3 All data sources are explained in Appendix 5.1. The gender wage
gap is the di¤erence between average earnings of male employees and of female
employees as a percentage of average earnings of male employees. The rate of
3For the gures we consider only the countries for which there are available data for both
variables for a su¢ ciently long period. In particular, the periods covered are: Denmark: 1996-
2005, Finland: 1995-2006, France: 1995-2005, Germany: 1996-2005, Ireland: 1995-2005, the
Netherlands: 1996-2005, Norway: 2001-2008, Sweden: 1995-2004, UK: 1997-2006, and the US:
1996-2007.
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cohabitation refers to cohabiting couples as a percentage of all couples. Figure 1
indicates the existence of a negative relationship between the two variables that
is further explored below.
Next we focus on the possible relationship between the relative price of home
appliances and cohabitation. In Figure 2 we plot the change in the relative
price of home appliances and the change in the cohabitation rate during the last
decade for various countries.4The relative price of home appliances is measured
as the ratio of the price of home appliances over the consumer price index. We
use 1996 as base year. There is evidence of a negative relationship between the
two variables, which is examined below.
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Figure 2
Figures 1 and 2 indicate the existence of a negative relationship between
the rate of cohabitation and the gender wage gap as well as between the rate
of cohabitation and the relative price of home appliance. We investigate the
relation between the cohabitation rate on the one hand, and the gender wage
gap and the relative price of home appliances on the other hand, using panel
data regressions below. Our specication is
(cohabitation rate)it = + 0(gender wage gap)it
+1(relative price of home appliances)it
+2(other controls)it (1)
4The countries and periods of reference are: Austria: 1997-2007, Denmark: 1996-2006,
Finland: 1996-2007, France: 1996-2005, Germany: 1996-2005, Ireland: 1995-2006, Italy: 1995-
2006, the Netherlands: 1996-2008, Norway: 2001-2008, Sweden: 1995-2005, UK: 1996-2007,
and the US: 1998-2008.
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The vector of additional controls includes the annual percentage rate of GDP
growth and the percentage of urban population. GDP growth reects the degree
of development of each country and it is expected to a¤ect positively cohabi-
tation. People who live in urban areas have usually less traditional stereotypes
about marriage and are more open to changes than people in rural areas. This is
why we expect it to have a positive e¤ect on the rate of cohabitation. Summary
statistics of the main variables of interest are shown in Table 5.
Table 5. Summary Statistics
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cohabitation 139 14.267 6.792 1.98 27.49
Gender wage gap 117 21.999 3.781 12.31 30.6
Relative price of home appliances 152 1.093 0.121 0.89 1.46
We rst check the correlations between the three variables of interest (Table
6). There is a statistically signicant negative correlation between the rate of
cohabitation and the gender wage gap as well as between the rate of cohabitation
and the price of home appliances.
Table 6. Correlations
Cohabitation Gender wage gap
Gender wage gap -0.340***
Relative price of home appliances -0.286*** 0.429***
We then estimate the model by OLS without including additional controls,
using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. The results are presented in
Table 7. In all specications both the relative price of home appliances and the
gender wage gap have a negative and statistically signicant e¤ect as expected.
Even when the two variables are introduced in isolation (specication 1) they
explain a good share in total variability in the rate of cohabitation. Their e¤ect is
robust to the inclusion of year dummies or time trend (specications 2 and 3). We
then include country dummies so as to capture country-specic di¤erences in the
rate of cohabitation. The coe¢ cients remain negative and signicant although
they decrease in absolute value (specications 4 and 5).5 This is in accordance
with Figures 1 and 2 where we veried that countries with the biggest change in
the gender wage gap and the relative price of home appliances experienced the
biggest change in the rate of cohabitation.
5The results when the country dummies are included should be interpreted with caution
due to the high value of R2:
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Table 7. Determinants of Cohabitation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gender wage gap
-0.291**
(0.141)
-0.316**
(0.124)
-0.307**
(0.142)
-0.176**
(0.078)
-0.144**
(0.072)
Relative price of
home appliances
-18.49***
(4.947)
-60.81***
(6.424)
-62.84***
(6.492)
-9.00***
(1.443)
-5.34**
(2.403)
Year dummies No No Yes No Yes
Trend No Yes No No No
Country dummies No No No Yes Yes
N. of Observations 95 95 95 95 95
R2 0.17 0.40 0.42 0.99 0.99
All specications include a constant not reported. ** indicates signicant at the 95% condence level and *** at the 99%.
In the last specication the estimated elasticity for the average value of co-
habitation and the gender wage gap is -0.198, i.e. on average, if the gender wage
gap narrows by 15% this will lead to an increase in cohabitation by 2.97%. The
estimated elasticity for the average value of cohabitation and the price of home
appliances is almost double; -0.37. This means that a 15% decrease in the rel-
ative price of home appliances leads to an increase in cohabitation by 5.55%.
Note that the countries we study have experienced a decrease around 15% both
in the gender wage gap and in the relative price of home appliances during the
last decade. Germany, for instance, has experienced a 18.42% decrease in the
gender wage gap and a 17.36% decrease in the relative price of home appliances.
According to our estimates, such changes would imply an increase in the rate
of cohabitation of about 3.64% and 6.42% respectively. Given that the rate of
cohabitation in Germany increased by 35.56% from 1996 to 2005, the narrowing
of the gender wage gap accounts for about 10% of the increase, and the decline
in the relative price of home appliances for almost 20%.
We then included GDP growth and the percentage of urban population in
all specications but their coe¢ cients were not statistically signicant from zero.
The results with respect to the variables of interest were not a¤ected by the
inclusion of any extra regressor.
Interestingly, religiosity does not seem to play any role either. The World
Values Survey contains information on religiosity for various countries in 1990
and in 1999. We use two alternative measures of religiosity; the percentage of
people who attend religious services more than once a week and the percentage
of people who practically never attend religious services.
In Figures 3 and 4 we plot the percentage change in religiosity and the per-
centage change in cohabitation rate. There is no strong evidence of a relationship
between the two variables.
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Figure 3
Figure 4
Finally, if we measure cohabitation as a ratio of all households (instead of all
couples) the gender wage gap loses its statistical signicance. This indicates that
the gender wage gap has an indirect e¤ect on cohabitation through a decrease
in the number of marriages. Before moving to the theoretical model though, it
is important to see whether cohabitation is more common among specic groups
of the population with respect to some characteristics (education, wealth, and
employment status).
2.3 Cross-sectional facts
Cohabiting and married couples di¤er along many dimensions. Cohabitation
in the US is more common among poor and less educated partners (Bumpass and
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Sweet, 1989). This pattern is still observed in more recent data according to the
report of Vital and Health Statistics (2010). Similar patterns are observed also
in UK (Goodman and Greaves, 2010). Table 8 shows the percent distribution of
women aged 15-44 in the US according to education and poverty characteristics.
Married women seem to be more educated and richer than the cohabiting ones.
There is a similar pattern also for men.
Furthermore married couples in the US are less alike with respect to hours and
earnings when compared to cohabiting ones (Brines and Joyner, 1999 and Jepsen
and Jepsen, 2002). Table 9 shows the percentage of cohabiting and married
women, who report being a housewife as their main occupation. We use data from
the 2002 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) on Family and Changing
Gender Roles as it contains information on the relationship and occupational
status of the respondents and of their partners.
Table 8
Percent distribution of women aged 15-44 by current marital or cohabiting status
Characteristic Married Cohabiting
Total 46.0 9.1
Education*
No high school diploma or GED 49.1 17.2
High school diploma or GED 56.7 11.3
Some college, no bachelor's degree 57.4 7.6
Bachelor's degree or higher 62.9 5.4
Percent of poverty level*
0-149% 40.9 13.0
  0-99% 39.1 13.1
150-299% 60.4 9.9
300% or higher 66.5 6.4
Source: Vital and Health Statistics, Series 23, No. 28, February 2010 based on NSFG 2002 data
The percent of poverty level is based on the 2001 poverty levels defined by the U.S. Census Bureau
*Limited to women aged 22-44
Percent distribution
Table 9
Percentage of housewives
Cohabiting women Married women
Austria 11.89 26.36
Denmark 2.76 2.73
Finland 4.24 4.46
France 4.92 16.38
Germany 2.77 17.40
Ireland 9.52 39.07
Netherlands 10.53 32.19
Norway 6.62 7.37
Spain 15.71 49.60
Sweden 0.00 1.13
UK 14.79 16.90
US 15.56 26.25
Source: ISSP 2002 (own calculations)
Age group: all ages
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In all countries except for Denmark the percentage of housewives is higher
among married than among cohabiting women.6 The traditional "woman at
home-man in the market" pattern is more common among married couples. Co-
habitation seems to be more symmetric, in the sense that both spouses work.
In order to highlight the way gender wage gap and price of home appliances
a¤ect cohabitation, in the next section we build a model that can account for
the changes in cohabitation and deliver the cross sectional facts that we have
just discussed. This model will allow us to examine the e¤ects of the gender
wage gap and the price of home appliances on agentss decision to get married,
cohabit or stay single. These two factors will act through the female labor
supply channel. Female labor supply will also be the key determinant of the
cross sectional di¤erences among married and cohabiting couples.
3 A Two-period Model
Consider the following model of marriage, cohabitation and divorce. Agents
live for two periods. They are heterogeneous with respect to wages. Both men
and women can work in the labor market but women face a gender wage gap.
They derive utility from a market good and a good produced at home using
durables and house work as inputs. In the 1st period they meet in pairs in
the marriage market and the man may propose marriage or cohabitation to
the woman through a take-it or leave-it o¤er. In the 2nd period couples face a
probability of divorce. Cohabitation di¤ers from marriage in terms of probability
and cost of dissolution.
There is a continuum of males (m) and females (f), each of measure one.
Agents discount time in rate 0 <  < 1: Each agent has 1 unit of time and
derives no utility from leisure. The utility function is additively separable of the
form
U(c; h) =  ln(c) + (1  ) ln(h);
where c is a market good and h a good produced at home.
There is a labor market where both men and women can work. There is
heterogeneity in wages among men and among women. Mens wages wm are
drawn from a distribution Fwm with support [w;w] : Womens wages are drawn
from a distribution Fwf with support [w; w] and  2 (0; 1) i.e. there is a
6The ISSP contains information on the occupation of both the respondent and the
spouse/partner but information on age is limited to the respondent. This prohibits us from
controlling for age since half of the observations are refered to the spouse/partner. Hence,
a part of the di¤erence in percentage of housewifes among cohabitors and married can be
attributed to the older age of married women.
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gender wage gap. This di¤erence in wages is exogenous7. There is a household
production technology that transforms work at home into home produced goods
h according to
h = A [d + (1  )(1  l)]1= ; 0 <  < 1;
where d is the stock of household durables which are purchased in price q, l
is labor supplied to the market (hence, 1   l is the time devoted to household
production), A is technological progress and  determines the elasticity of sub-
stitution between durables and house work ( 1
1 ). We assume that durables
purchased in the 1st period depreciate fully by the beginning of the 2nd period.
Married/cohabiting men devote all of their available time to market work, while
married/cohabiting women distribute their time between market work lf and
house work (1  lf ).8
There is also a marriage market where single people meet randomly potential
partners of the opposite sex (who are also single). In the 1st period people meet
in pairs. Upon meeting, the man makes take-it or leave-it o¤ers to the woman.9
Each o¤er consists of a sextuple
 
ci1f ; l
i
1f ; d
i
1; c
i
2f ; l
i
2f ; d
i
2

where i is the type of
marital institution, i.e. marriage or cohabitation. Note that the o¤er will be
a function of (wm; wf ). Cohabitation di¤ers from marriage with respect to the
divorce cost. The divorce cost entailed with marriage ( > 0) is higher than the
one entailed with cohabitation due to the law. We normalize the separation cost
of cohabitors to zero. The woman can either accept the o¤er and enter into a
union with the man, or reject the o¤er and remain single. The reason why agents
would prefer entering a marital institution to singlehood is specialization. The
woman will work at home in order to produce the household good and the man
in the market where he earns more than the woman.
We assume that the good produced at home is a shared good for the couple
with sharing parameter  2 1
2
; 1

. Hence, if the amount of the household good
produced is h, each partner will consume h: Note that as  ! 1 there are
economies of scale in the consumption of the household good. This is because the
needs of a household grow with each additional member but not in a proportional
way. Needs for housing space, electricity, etc will not be twice as high for a
household with two members than for a single person.
In the 2nd period the agents who matched in the 1st period and have entered
a union (marriage or cohabitation) face an exogenous probability of divorce m
7A possible extention is to endogenize the gender wage gap through the work experience
channel (a form of human capital accumulation). See among others Albanesi and Olivetti
(2009a), and Erosa et al. (2010).
8We relax this assumption by assuming that the man supplies a xed amount of time to
household production. For a reasonable amount (less than 20%) we get a very similar pattern
of marital outcomes (See Appendix 5.3).
9This assumption is not critical. In Appendix 5.3 we analyze the case that the woman
makes the take-it or leave-it o¤er to the man and the results are una¤ected.
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or separation c respectively, with 0  m  1, 0  c  1, and m < c:10
We assume that divorced/separated agents do not rematch in the 2nd period.
Agents who are single in the beginning of the 2nd period did not match in the 1st
period waiting for a di¤erent match (in terms of wages). In the 2nd period single
agents meet again in the marriage market. Upon meeting single men/women
make/receive take-it or leave-it o¤ers just like in the 1st period.11
3.1 Single agents problem
Below we dene and characterize the utility maximization problem of single
and divorced agents and the optimal marriage/cohabitation proposal.12 In the
analysis that follows we set  equal to 0; i.e. we use a Cobb-Douglas production
function in order to get analytical results. The problem of a single agent in the
current period (1st or 2nd) is
U(csg(wg); h
s
g(wg)) = max
csg>0;h
s
g>0;0<l
s
g1;dsg>0
 ln(csg) + (1  ) ln(hsg)
subject to
csg = wgl
s
g   qdsg;
and
hsg = A(d
s
g)
(1  lsg);1 
where g = m; f stands for male and female.
Combining the rst order conditions, and the constraints we get
dsg = (1  )
wg
q
; (2)
lsg = + (1  ); (3)
hsg = A((1  )
wg
q
)((1  )(1  ));1  (4)
and
csg = wg: (5)
Note that working hours are constant. Thus, improvements in household
technology do not alter the amount of labour supplied by single agents. This is
simply due to the Cobb-Douglas assumption, and with  6= 0, improvements in
10There is empirical evidence that cohabitations are more unstable than marriage (Bumpass
and Sweet, 1989, and Bumpass and Lu, 2000). Alternatively we could endogenize the divorce
decision by assuming that agents derive utility from a match quality that evolves over time.
Note that also in this case cohabitation will be more unstable than marriage, since the couples
that decide to cohabit will be the ones with low match quality (See Brien at el, 2006).
11Since there are only 2 periods the o¤er in the 2nd (last) period will be a triple (cif ; l
i
f ; d
i
f ).
12See appendix 7.2 for all the derivations.
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household technology do a¤ect working hours. The womans reservation utility
in the second period is then
U sf (wf ) =  ln(wf ) + (1  ) ln(A((1  )
wf
q
)((1  )(1  ))1 ): (6)
Note that the womans reservation utility increases as her wage goes up or
as the price of durables goes down. This is because the higher wage allows the
single woman to buy more durables (remember that the labor supply is constant)
and therefore to produce more household good. Lowering the price of durables
has the same e¤ect.
3.2 Divorced agents problem
The problem that a divorced agent faces in the 2nd period depends on the
divorce cost  and is given by
Udg (wg) = max
cdg>0;h
d
g>0;0<l
d
g1;ddg>0
 ln(cdg) + (1  ) ln(hdg) (7)
subject to
cdg = wgl
d
g   qddg   ;
and
hdg = A(d
d
g)
(1  ldg)1 ;
where g = m; f stands for male and female.
The rst order conditions are
ddg = (1  )
(wg   )
q
; (8)
ldg = + (1  ) +
(1  )(1  )
wg
; (9)
hdg = A((1  )
(wg   )
q
)((1  )(1  )(1  
wg
));1  (10)
and
cdg = (wg   ): (11)
The rst order conditions are similar to the ones of the problem of a single
man. The di¤erence lies on the budget constraint, and in particular on the cost
of divorce. The divorce cost decreases the quantity of the durable good and
the quantity of the consumption good. Also note that the labor supply is not
constant as in the case of singles, but it depends negatively on the wage due to
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the xed cost of divorce. More specically, if the wage goes down the divorced
agent will have to work more hours in order to cover the divorce cost.
Hence, the utility of a divorced agent is
Udg (wg) =  ln((wg ))+(1 ) ln(A((1 )
(wg   )
q
)((1 )(1 )(1  
wg
))1 );
(12)
where g = m; f stands for male and female.
There are also women who chose to remain single in the 1st period, waiting
for a better match in the 2nd period. Let us dene the expected utility that a
woman will derive in the 2nd period, who was single in the 1st period by V 2f (wf ):
She can either remain single in the 2nd period or enter a union (cohabitation or
marriage). Her decision depends on the probability of meeting a man willing and
able to make an acceptable proposal. Let rc =
R
wm2W c dF (wm) be the fraction
of men who can propose cohabitation and rm =
R
wm2Wm dF (wm) be the fraction
of men who can propose marriage. Then,
V 2f (wf ) = (1  rc   rm)U sf (wf ) +
Z
wm2W c
( ln(ccf ) + (1  ) ln(hc))dF (wm)
+
Z
wm2Wm
( ln(cmf ) + (1  ) ln(hm))dF (wm)
= (1  rc   rm)U sf (wf ) + Erc( ln(ccf ) + (1  ) ln(hc))
+ Erm( ln(c
m
f ) + (1  ) ln(hm))
= (1  rc   rm)U sf (wf ) + rcV 2;cf (wf ) + rmV 2;mf (wf ); 8 wm; (13)
where the last equality follows from the fact that no man can inuence rc; Erc;
rm; Erm ; U
s
f (wf ) and hence each woman of type wf has a xed reservation value
for accepting a take-it or leave-it o¤er independently from the mans type wm:
The functions V 2;cf (wf ) and V
2;m
f (wf ) are the utility that a woman, who was
single in the 1st period, will derive in the 2nd period from cohabitation and
marriage, respectively.
Note that since there is no possibility of divorce after the 2nd period the
utility derived from marriage or cohabitation is the same for all men and for
all women. Hence, V 2;mf (wf ) = V
2;c
f (wf ), i.e. women are indi¤erent between
cohabitation and marriage. The only thing that matters for a woman is whether
she receives a proposal or not. Let r = rm + rc: Then (13) becomes
V 2f (wf ) = (1  r)U sf (wf ) + rV 2;mf (wf )
= (1  r)U sf (wf ) + r(ln(cmf (wf )) + (1  ) ln(hm(wf )));8wm:
(13a)
17
3.3 Optimal marriage proposal in the 2nd period
Now let us dene the problem of a man who wants to propose marriage/
cohabitation to a woman in the 2nd period given that the woman will accept the
proposal (participation constraint). The problem consists of nding the triple 
cmf ; l
m
f ; d
m

that maximizes his utility given the budget constraint (BC), the
household production technology (HPT), the womans participation constraint
(WPC), and the utility of the woman when single. It is given by
max
cmf >0;0<l
m
f 1;dm>0
 ln(cmm) + (1  ) ln(hm) (14)
subject to
cmm + c
m
f = wm + wf l
m
f   qdm; (BC)
hm = A(dm)(1  lmf )1 ; (HPT)
and
U sf (wf )   ln(cmf ) + (1  ) ln(hm); (WPC)
where U sf (wf ) is given by (6).
Combining the rst order conditions and the constraints,13 we get
dm =
(1  )(wf + wm)
q
; (15)
lmf = (+ (1  ))  (1  )(1  )
wm
wf
; (16)
and
hm = A(
(1  )(wf + wm)
q
)((1  )(1  )(1 + wm
wf
)):1  (17)
Given the Cobb-Douglas assumption, the labor supply of a married/cohabiting
woman does not depend on A and q. Hence, improvements in the household pro-
duction technology only increase the quantity of purchased durables and there-
fore the quantity of the home good produced. However, in contrast to the case
of singles, the labor supply of the married/cohabiting woman depends on both
her own wage (positively) and on the wage of her spouse (negatively). Hence,
changes in the gender wage gap will have an impact on female labor supply.
Note that the WPC will always bind, since the man has all the bargaining
power. Hence, even if the woman accepts the proposal in the 2nd period her
utility will not alter (it will exactly match her reservation utility U sf (wf ) in sin-
glehood). The man, however, can be better o¤ if the woman accepts the proposal,
thanks to specialization. Therefore,
U sf (wf ) =  ln(c
m
f ) + (1  ) ln(hm):
13See appendix 7.2 for the corner solutions.
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Then,
cmf = exp

1

U sf (wf ) 
(1  )

ln(hm)

; (18)
where U sf (wf ) and h
m are given by (6) and (17) respectively. Then (13a) becomes
V 2f (wf ) = (1  r)U sf (wf ) + rV 2;mf (wf )
= (1  r)U sf (wf ) + rU sf (wf ) = U sf (wf ) (19)
=  ln(wf ) + (1  ) ln(A((1  )wf
q
)((1  )(1  ))1 ):
Note that although the utility that the woman will derive in a union will be
the same as the utility that she derives in singlehood, the allocation will di¤er,
i.e. csf 6= cmf and hsf 6= hm: In particular, using (4), (5), (17) and (18), we get
 ln cmf    ln csf = (1  ) [lnwf   ln(wf + wm)  ln ] < 0 (20)
and
(1  ) ln hmf   (1  ) lnhsf = (1  ) [ln(wf + wm)  lnwf + ln ] > 0; (21)
8 2
h
wf
wf+wm
; 1
i
; i.e. a woman who decides to get married or cohabit in the
2nd period will consume less consumption good but more household good than
if she had stayed single. Note that the increase in the household good exactly
compensates for the decrease in the consumption good.
3.4 Optimal marital status in the 2nd period
Is it possible that marriage/cohabitation will not be feasible in the 2nd
period? It may be the case that a man is better o¤ single, so he will not be
willing to propose to the woman. It may also be the case that the man is not
able to propose because his budget is not enough so as to satisfy the womans
participation constraint, and make her accept his proposal. Both cases depend
on the combination of wf and wm: Formally, marriage/cohabitation in the 2nd
period is not feasible if the man is better o¤ single, i.e.
U sm(wm) >  ln(c
m
m) + (1  ) ln(hm);
or if he cannot satisfy the WPC, i.e. both
U sf (wf ) =  ln(c
m
f ) + (1  ) ln(hm);
and
cmm + c
m
f  wm + wf lmf   qdm
cannot hold simultaneously with
cmm > 0; c
m
f > 0; 0  lmf < 1; dm > 0; hm > 0:
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3.5 Optimal marriage proposal in the 1st period
Now let us focus on the optimal marriage proposal in the 1st period. A man
who wants to propose marriage to a woman in the 1st period has also to consider
the probability and the cost of divorce. Note that his o¤er is renegotiation-proof;
even if we allow for renegotiation, the man will have no incentive to change his
o¤er in the 2nd period because the womans participation constraint will always
bind. The problem consists of nding the vector
 
c1;mf ; l
1;m
f ; d
1;m; c2;mf ; l
2;m
f ; d
2;m

that maximizes his utility given the budget constraint in each period (BC1) and
(BC2), the household production technology in each period (HPT1) and (HPT2),
the womans participation constraint in each period (WPC1) and (WPC2), as
well as his utility if divorced, the utility of the woman when single, and the utility
of the woman if divorced
max
c1;mf >0;0<l
1;m
f <1;d
1;m>0;c2;mf >0;0<l
2;m
f <1;d
2;m>0;
 ln(c1;mm ) + (1  ) ln(h1;m)
+ 

(1  m)   ln(c2;mm ) + (1  ) ln(h2;m)+ mUdm(wm)
subject to
c1;mm + c
1;m
f = wm + wf l
1;m
f   qd1;m; (BC1)
c2;mm + c
2;m
f = wm + wf l
2;m
f   qd2;m; (BC2)
h1;m = A(d1;m)(1  l1;mf )1 ; (HPT1)
h2;m = A(d2;m)(1  l2;mf )1 ; (HPT2)
(1 + )U sf (wf )   ln(c1;mf ) + (1  ) ln(h1;m)
+[(1  m) ( ln(c2;mf ) + (1  ) ln(h2;m)) + mUdf (wf )];
(WPC1)
and
U sf (wf )   ln(c2;mf ) + (1  ) ln(h2;m); (WPC2)
where U sf (wf ) is given by (6), and U
d
m(wm) and U
d
f (wf ) are given by (12).
Combining the rst order conditions and the constraints we nd that
d1;m = d2;m;
and
l1;mf = l
2;m
f ;
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and therefore
h1;m = h2;m:
Thus, the mans take-it or leave-it o¤er to the woman will entail the same
amount of durables, hours of market work, and therefore hours of housework and
household good as the ones we found when we characterized the 2nd period (15)-
(17). Moreover, the consumption good he o¤ers to the woman in the 2nd period
(c2;mf ) will again be given by (18) since the womans participation constraint in
the 2nd period (WPC2) is the same.
The di¤erence lies on the amount of consumption good o¤ered in the 1st
period (c1;mf ). The man will have to o¤er as much c
1;m
f as it is necessary so as to
satisfy the womans participation constraint in the 1st period (WPC1). However,
the womans participation constraint in the 1st period di¤ers from the one in the
2nd period because of the dissolution probability and its resulting cost. Again,
the man will exactly match the womans reservation utility because he has all
the bargaining power
(1 + )U sf (wf ) =  ln(c
1;m
f ) + (1  ) ln(h1;m)
+ [(1  m) ( ln(c2;mf ) + (1  ) ln(h2;m)) + mUdf (wf )]:
Taking into account that the womans participation constraint will bind also in
the 2nd period we get
(1+)U sf (wf ) =  ln(c
1;m
f )+ (1 ) ln(h1m)+[(1  m)U sf (wf )+mUdf (wf )];
and therefore
c1;mf = exp

1

 
U sf (wf )  (1  ) ln(hm1 ) + m(U sf (wf )  Udf (wf ))

: (22)
Equation (22) completes the characterization of the optimal marriage pro-
posal. The next step is to characterize the optimal cohabitation proposal. Only
then the man will be able to determine his optimal marital status.
3.6 Optimal cohabitation proposal
The problem of the optimal cohabitation proposal in the 1st period is the
same as the one of the optimal marriage proposal, but without any divorce cost
( = 0) and with higher dissolution probability c > m.
Hence, in both periods, the man will o¤er to the woman the same amount
of durables (dc), hours of market work (lcf), and therefore hours of housework
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(1  lcf) and household good (hc) as the ones of the marriage proposal (15)-(17).
The amount of consumption good o¤ered in the 2nd period (c2;cf ) will be given
by (18).
What about the amount of consumption good in the 1st period (c1;cf )? The
man will have to o¤er as much c1;cf as it is necessary so as to exactly match
the womans reservation utility. However, the womans participation constraint
di¤ers from the one in marriage in terms of dissolution probability and cost.
(1 + )U sf (wf ) =  ln(c
1;c
f ) + (1  ) ln(h1;c)
+ [(1  c) ( ln(c2;cf ) + (1  ) ln(h2;c)) + cU sf (wf )];
which can be written as
(1 + )U sf (wf ) =  ln(c
1;c
f ) + (1  ) ln(h1c) + [(1  c)U sf (wf ) + cU sf (wf )]:
This simplies into
U sf (wf ) =  ln(c
1;c
f ) + (1  ) ln(h1;c);
from which we get
c1;cf = exp

1

(U sf (wf )  (1  ) ln(h1;m))

= c2;cf : (23)
Hence, if the man wants to propose cohabitation to the woman in the 1st
period he has to make the same o¤er as in the 2nd period. Contrary to the
marriage o¤er, the man will o¤er the same amount of consumption good to the
woman in both periods. This is because in the case of cohabitation there is no
dissolution cost. If there was no divorce cost in the case of marriage, equations
(22) and (23) would be equal, and as a result, the proposal of marriage would
be identical to the proposal of cohabitation. With positive divorce cost though,
U sf (wf ) > U
d
f (wf ) in (22) which yields c
1;m
f > c
1;c
f , i.e. the man has to o¤er more
consumption good to the woman in marriage than in cohabitation (in this way
the man compensates the woman for possible divorce costs).
3.7 Optimal marital status in the 1st period
In order to determine the optimal marital status the man has to compare his
utility in singlehood to his utility in cohabitation and to his utility in marriage.
In the two latter cases he should be able to satisfy the womans participation
constraint or else singlehood is the only possible option. Singlehood is optimal
if the man is better o¤ single, i.e.
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(1 + )U sm(wm) >  ln(c
1;m
m ) + (1  ) ln(h1;m)
+[(1  m) ( ln(c2;mm ) + (1  ) ln(h2;m)) + mUdm(wm)];
and
(1 + )U sm(wm) >  ln(c
1;c
m ) + (1  ) ln(h1;c)
+[(1  c) ( ln(c2;cm ) + (1  ) ln(h2;c)) + cU cm(wm)];
or if he cannot satisfy the WPC in marriage and cohabitation in any of the two
periods, i.e.
ct;mm + c
t;m
f  wm + wf lt;mf   qdt;m
cannot hold simultaneously with
ct;mm > 0; c
t;m
f > 0; 0  lt;mf < 1; dt;m > 0; ht;m > 0
for some t = 1; 2 and
ct;cm + c
t;c
f  wm + wf lt;cf   qdt;c
cannot hold simultaneously with
ct;cm > 0; c
t;c
f > 0; 0  lt;cf < 1; dt;c > 0; ht;c > 0
for some t = 1; 2:
Marriage is optimal if the man is better o¤married, i.e. his discounted utility
in marriage for both periods is higher than his discounted utility in singlehood
and his discounted utility in cohabitation. Similarly for cohabitation.
Up to now we have set up and solved a model of marriage and cohabitation,
whose main ingredients are the gender wage gap and the household production.
We showed that the man will propose marriage or cohabitation to a woman in or-
der to maximize his utility. In the case that the womans reservation utility is too
high, matching may not be feasible. The outcome will depend on the combina-
tion of wages of each prospective couple (wm; wf ). In the following subsection we
examine marital outcomes for di¤erent combinations of male and female wages.
3.8 Numerical Example
As it became clear from the theoretical model, the optimal marital status
of the agents depends on the combination of wages of the prospective couple.
In other words, when a man meets a woman, he will either propose marriage or
cohabitation to her, or he will prefer to stay single, or he will not even be able to
propose. The outcome will depend on the combination of their wages. In order
23
to get a better understanding of the mechanics of the model we solve a numerical
example using the parameter values in Table 10.
We have not picked these values so as to match any data, i.e. we do not cali-
brate the model since it is too simplistic. Still, we have chosen them in a way that
generates "reasonable" results (e.g. non negative consumption) and gives pre-
dictions close to the data estimates. Our benchmark is the US economy in 2008.
The value of the discount rate  = 0:96 is standard in the literature. We assume
that the agents value the consumption good as much as the household good and
we set their weights equal, i.e.  = 0:5:We set  = 1:7 following the equivalence
scale proposed by OECD (1 for the rst member of the household, 0.7 for the
second). The probability of dissolution in cohabitation is set almost double than
the probability of divorce in marriage. In particular, we set the probability of
divorce for married couples m = 0:30 following Stevenson and Wolfers (2007b).
For cohabiting couples we set the probability of dissolution c = 0:50; accord-
ing to the report of Vital and Health Statistics (2010) about half of cohabiting
unions do not survive after 1 year of cohabitation. Setting A = 20 in the house-
hold production function and q = 2 for the price of durables gives an average
share of expenditure on durables over labor income equal to 21% which is in ac-
cordance with recent estimates (Baxter and Rotz, 2009). The divorce cost  is set
equal to 3.5 in order the percentage of married population to be 55%, i.e. close
to its value in 2008 (Source: http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-
fam/cps2008/tabA1-all.xls). We start with a gender wage gap  =78% and we
then examine the e¤ect of decreasing it to 70% of mens wage, i.e. its value
in the beginning of the 1990s (Source: http://www.iwpr.org/pdf/C350.pdf).14
The lowest wage is normalized to 10, and it is assumed that wages are uniformly
distributed between 10 and 100 with increments of 10.
Table 10
Parameters Values
Preferences


0:5
0:96
Public good parameter  1=1:7
Household production technology
A


q
20
0:19
0:2
2! 5
Wages
w

[10; 20; :::; 100]
0:78! 0:70
Dissolution
m
c

0:30
0:50
3:5
14In the model the gender wage gap is captured by the parameter  , which expresses womens
wage as percentage of mens wage. Hence, the lower  , the wider the gender wage gap.
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In the literature improvements of household production technology have been
modeled as a reduction in the price of home appliances (e.g. Greenwood et al.,
2005). We set  = 0:19 and  = 0:2; values estimated by McGrattan, Rogerson
and Wright (1997). Regarding the change of the price of home appliances, the
available data for the US cover only the period between 1998-2008, during which
the decline was 32% (US Bureau of Labor Statistics). We assume a moderate
decline of similar magnitude for the years between 1990-1998 and we set the price
in 1990 equal to 5, i.e. a 60% increase with respect to the price in 2008, which
was 2.
3.8.1 The e¤ect of the gender wage gap
First we examine the e¤ects of the narrowing of the gender wage gap on
womens market labor supply and on all agentsmarital decisions. Recall that
the agents live only for 2 periods. Therefore, in the last (2nd) period there is no
di¤erence between marriage and cohabitation as dissolution is not possible any
more. This is why we will focus only on the 1st period.
The e¤ect of the gender wage gap on agents marital status is shown in
Figure 4. When gender gap in pay is narrow, more agents choose to stay single
or cohabit. As a result, the number of cohabiting agents as a percentage of all
matched agents goes up, reducing the percentage of married population.
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Figure 4
This e¤ect is driven by changes in the market labor supply of the females.
The narrowing of the gender wage gap makes women work more in the market,
improving their outside option (singlehood). It is then more costly for a man to
satisfy the womans participation constraint and convince her to match with him.
Moreover, the returns to specialization decrease, weakening the incentives to get
married. Marriage implies higher cost and lower probability of dissolution than
cohabitation. In the absence of substantial returns to specialization, cohabitation
is favored against marriage.
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Table 7
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.14 0.20
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.13 0.19 0.25
0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.11 0.19 0.24 0.29
0 0 0 0 0 0.09 0.18 0.24 0.29 0.33
0 0 0 0 0.07 0.17 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.38
0 0 0 0.03 0.16 0.25 0.31 0.36 0.40 0.42
0 0 0 0.15 0.26 0.33 0.38 0.42 0.65 0.65
0 0 0.14 0.27 0.35 0.40 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.65
0 0.12 0.30 0.39 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.65
0.09 0.37 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.65
with narrow gender wage gap (2008)
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0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.12 0.19 0.25 0.29
0 0 0 0 0 0.11 0.20 0.26 0.31 0.34
0 0 0 0 0.10 0.20 0.27 0.32 0.36 0.39
0 0 0 0 0.21 0.29 0.34 0.39 0.42 0.65
0 0 0.08 0.22 0.31 0.37 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65
0 0.06 0.26 0.36 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65
0.02 0.33 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65
Female market labor supply by marital status
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with wide gender wage gap (1990)
Table 7 depicts the e¤ect of the gender wage gap on female market labor
supply. In the benchmark economy (left panel) the model predicts that 64% of
women will participate in the market. This value is in accordance with recent
statistics (US Bureau of Labor Statistics). First note that the labor supply
of single women remains fairly constant,15 i.e. it is almost una¤ected by the
narrowing of the gender wage gap.16 By contrast, the labor supply of all married
and cohabiting women increases substantially after the narrowing of the gender
wage gap. In the intensive margin, single women work more than both married
and cohabiting women. Furthermore, a cohabiting woman will work more hours
in the market than a married woman at the same wage rate.
A more interesting implication of the model has to do with the extensive
margin of female labor force participation. There are many married women who
are fully specialized in home production, while almost all cohabiting women do
work in the market. Moreover, cohabiting couples are composed by partners with
similar wages. This is in accordance with the study of Brines and Joyner (1999)
who show that economic equality is a key element of a long term cohabiting
relationship and specialization for marriage.
3.8.2 The e¤ect of the price of home appliances
We examine the e¤ect of improvements in the household production technol-
ogy through a decrease in the price of home appliances. The results are shown in
Figure 5. When home appliances are cheaper all men and women are better o¤
because they can substitute house work with durables. However, some couples
who would get married when home appliances were expensive, prefer to cohabit
after the decline in prices. For these couples the benets of marriage (special-
ization and returns to scale) are not enough so as to compensate the man for
15The model predicts that single women devote around 65% of their time to market labor.
This number is reasonable, given the models assumption that there is no leisure.
16This is in accordance with the data, see Jones et al (2003)
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the cost of a possible divorce. On the one hand cohabitation can be dissolved
without any cost. On the other hand cohabitation has a higher probability of
dissolution. However, a possible dissolution can be accommodated more easily
after the decrease in price of home appliances. Hence, these couples decide to
cohabit instead of getting married.
There are also singles who decide to cohabit after the decline in price of
home appliances in order to benet from the increasing returns to scale in the
household good. All in all, the rate of cohabitation increases and the percentage
of unmarried population (cohabiting and singles) goes up.
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Similarly to the narrowing of the gender wage gap, the decrease in the price
of home appliances also leads to an increase in female market labor supply (Table
8).
Table 8
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.14 0.20
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.13 0.19 0.25
0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.11 0.19 0.24 0.29
0 0 0 0 0 0.09 0.18 0.24 0.29 0.33
0 0 0 0 0.07 0.17 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.38
0 0 0 0.03 0.16 0.25 0.31 0.36 0.40 0.42
0 0 0 0.15 0.26 0.33 0.38 0.42 0.65 0.65
0 0 0.14 0.27 0.35 0.40 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.65
0 0.12 0.30 0.39 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.65
0.09 0.37 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.65
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Female market labor supply by marital status
with low price of home appliances (2008)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.09 0.15
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 0.15 0.20
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.14 0.20 0.25
0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0.13 0.20 0.25 0.29
0 0 0 0 0.02 0.13 0.20 0.26 0.31 0.34
0 0 0 0 0.12 0.21 0.27 0.32 0.36 0.39
0 0 0 0.11 0.22 0.29 0.34 0.38 0.63 0.63
0 0 0.09 0.23 0.32 0.37 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.63
0 0.08 0.26 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.63
0.05 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.63
Female market labor supply by marital status
with high price of home appliances (1990)
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4 Conclusions
This paper examines the rising forms of quasi marriages from an economic
perspective. It presents some cross-country evidence on the evolvement of cohab-
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itation and it is an attempt of getting a more general understanding of marital
behavior in the last decade.
Our conjecture is that more exible types of family are associated with the
improvement in the household production technology and the narrowing of the
gender wage gap. These changes enabled women to work more in the market
and be nancially less dependent from their partners. Likewise, these changes
reduced mens need to have a housewife for the household chores. In the data
the price of home appliances as a proxy of household production technology
has a strong e¤ect on cohabitation conrming the general view that household
production technology is a determinant of marital behavior. The gender wage
gap also plays a role.
An interesting implication of the model is that women in cohabiting units do
not specialize fully at home in contrast to the married ones. This is a result of
the relative instability of cohabitation as a marital institution through its ease
of dissolution. Moreover, a married woman, who does work in the market, works
less hours than a cohabiting woman at the same wage rate.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Data sources
Table A1. Data on cohabitation
Country Source
Austria Statistik Austria,www.statistik.at
Belgium17 SPF Economie - Direction generale Statistique et
Information economique selon le Registre National,
www.statbel.fgov.be
Denmark Statistics Denmark, www.dst.dk
Finland Statistics Finland, www.stat.
France INED, www.ined.fr
Germany Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, www.destatis.de
Hungary UNECE, www.unece.org
Ireland UNECE, www.unece.org
Italy UNECE, www.unece.org
Netherlands Statistics Netherlands, www.cbs.nl
Norway Statistics Norway, www.ssb.no
Spain UNECE, www.unece.org
Sweden UNECE, www.unece.org
UK own calculations from the General Household Survey,
www.esds.ac.uk
US U.S. Census Bureau, www.census.gov
Table A2. Data on price of home appliances and CPI
Country Source
US Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov/data
Other countries Eurostat, http//epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
Table A3. Data on price of GDP growth and urban population
Country Source
All countries World Bank (WDI), www.worldbank.org
17The data for Belgium do not refer solely to cohabiting couples but also include pairs of
cohabiting persons of the same or di¤erent sex, eg. two siblings or two friends.
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Table A4. Data on gender wage gap
Country Source
Austria UNECE, www.unece.org
Belgium Eurostat, http//epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
Denmark OECD, www.oecd.org
Finland OECD, www.oecd.org and UNECE, www.unece.org
France Eurostat, http//epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu and OECD
Germany Eurostat, http//epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
Hungary UNECE, www.unece.org
Ireland Eurostat, http//epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
Italy -
Netherlands Eurostat, http//epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
Norway UNECE, www.unece.org
Spain Eurostat, http//epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
Sweden Eurostat, http//epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
UK OECD, www.oecd.org
US U.S. Census Bureau, www.census.gov
5.2 First order conditions
5.2.1 Single agents problem
The problem of a single agent g = m; f is
max
csg>0;h
s
g>0;0<l
s
g1;dsg>0
 ln(wgl
s
g   qdsg) + (1  ) ln(A(dsg)(1  lsg)1 ):
Below we derive the rst order conditions of this problem. The rst order
condition associated with the labor supply decision is given by
wg
wglsg   qdsg
=
(1  )(1  )A(dsg)(1  lsg) 
A(dsg)
(1  lsg)1 
;
which reduces to
wg
wglsg   qdsg
=
(1  )(1  )
1  lsg
: (S1)
The rst order condition associated with the amount of durables is given by
q
wglsg   qdsg
=
(1  )A(dsg) 1(1  lsg)1 
A(dsg)
(1  lsg)1 
;
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which becomes
q
wglsg   qdsg
=
(1  )
dsg
: (S2)
5.2.2 2nd period optimal marriage proposal
The optimal marriage proposal problem in the 2nd period is
max
cmf >0;0lmf <1;dm>0
 ln(wm + wf l
m
f   qdm   cmf ) + (1  ) ln(A(dm)(1  lmf )1 )
subject to
 ln(wf )+(1 ) ln(A((1 )wf
q
)((1 )(1 ))1 )   ln(cmf )+(1 ) ln(A(dm)(1 lmf )1 ):
The rst order conditions for interior solutions (lf > 0) are given by (M1)-
(M3). Derivating with respect to the womans consumption good we get

wm + wf lmf   qdm   cmf
= 

cmf
;
which becomes
1
wm + wf lmf   qdm   cmf
= 
1
cmf
: (M1)
Derivating with respect to the womans labor supply we get
wf
wm + wf lmf   qdm   cmf
  (1  )(1  )
(1  lmf )
= 
(1  )(1  )
(1  lmf )
;
which can be written as
wf (1  lmf )  (1  )(1  )(wm + wf lmf   qdm   cmf )
(wm + wf lmf   qdm   cmf )
= (1 )(1 ): (M2)
Lastly, derivating with respect to the amount of durables we get
q
wm + wf lmf   qdm   cmf
  (1  )
dm
= 
(1  )
dm
;
which can be written as
qdm   (1  )(wm + wf lmf   qdm   cmf )
(wm + wf lmf   qdm   cmf )
= (1  ): (M3)
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5.2.3 1st period optimal marriage proposal
The optimal marriage proposal problem in the 1st period is
max
c1;mf ;l
1;m
f ;d
1;m;
c
2;m
f
;l
2;m
f
;d2;m
 ln(wm+wf l
1;m
f   qd1;m  c1;mf )+ (1 ) ln(A(d1;m)(1  l1;mf )1 )
+ 

(1  m)   ln(wm + wf l2;mf   qd2;m   c2;mf )
+(1  ) ln(A(d2;m)(1  l2;mf )1 )

+ mUdm(wm)

subject to
(1 + )U sf (wf )   ln(c1;mf ) + (1  ) ln(h1;m)
+[(1  m) ( ln(c2;mf ) + (1  ) ln(h2;m)) + mUdf (wf )];
(WPC1)
and
U sf (wf )   ln(c2;mf ) + (1  ) ln(h2;m): (WPC2)
The rst order conditions for interior solutions (l1;mf > 0; l
2;m
f > 0) are given
by (M11-M23). In particular, derivating with respect to the consumption of the
woman in the 1st period we get

wm + wf l
1;m
f   qd1;m   c1;mf
= 

c1;mf
;
which simplies into
1
wm + wf l
1;m
f   qd1;m   c1;mf
= 
1
c1;mf
. (M11)
The rst order condition associated with the womans labor supply is
wf
wm + wf l
1;m
f   qd1;m   c1;mf
  (1  )(1  )
(1  l1;mf )
= 
(1  )(1  )
(1  l1;mf )
;
which is equivalent to
wf (1  l1;mf )  (1  )(1  )(wm + wf l1;mf   qd1;m   c1;mf )
(wm + wf l
1;m
f   qd1;m   c1;mf )
= (1  )(1  ):
(M12)
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Derivating with respect to the amount of durables in the 1st period gives
q
wm + wf l
1;m
f   qd1;m   c1;mf
  (1  )
d1;m
= 
(1  )
d1;m
;
which can be written as
qd1;m   (1  )(wm + wf l1;mf   qd1;m   c1;mf )
(wm + wf l
1;m
f   qd1;m   c1;mf )
= (1  ): (M13)
Similarly, the rst order conditions associated with the decisions of the 2nd
period are given by
(1  m)
wm + wf l
2;m
f   qd2;m   c2;mf
= ((1  m) + ) 1
c2;mf
; (M21)
for the consumption good of the woman,
(1  m)
wf (1  l2;mf )  (1  )(1  )(wm + wf l2;mf   qd2;m   c2;mf )
(wm + wf l
2;m
f   qd2;m   c2;mf )
= ((1  m) + )(1  )(1  ); (M22)
for the labor supply of the woman, and
(1 m)
qd2;m   (1  )(wm + wf l2;mf   qd2;m   c2;mf )
(wm + wf l
2;m
f   qd2;m   c2;mf )
= ((1 m)+)(1 );
(M23)
for the amount of durables.
5.2.4 Corner solutions
5.2.5 2nd period optimal marriage/cohabitation proposal
We have assumed that married/cohabiting men devote all their available time
to market work while married/cohabiting women distribute their time between
market work and housework. In the case that women specialize completely in
housework (lf = 0) the rst order condition with respect to the consumption of
the female and the durables remain unchanged
1
wm   qdm   cmf
= 
1
cmf
; (C1)
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and
qdm   (1  )(wm   qdm   cmf )
(wm   qdm   cmf )
= (1  ); (C2)
while the rst order condition with respect to female labor is now given by the
Kuhn-Tucker condition
lmf = 0;
wf   (1  )(1  )(wm   qdm   cmf )
(wm   qdm   cmf )
  (1  )(1  ) > 0: (C3)
Combining (C1) to (C3), and the constraints we get
dm =
(1  )wm
(+ (1  ))q ;
lmf = 0;
hm = A(
(1  )wm
(+ (1  ))q )
: (C4)
5.3 Robustness
5.3.1 The married/cohabitating man does not work full time in the
market
The model presented in Section 3 is based on the assumption that the man
works full time in the market and the woman allocates her time between the
house- and market work. We relax this assumption by assuming that the man
devotes a xed amount of time to housework denoted by z: The optimal marital
proposal in the 2nd period becomes
max
cmf >0;0<l
m
f 1;dm>0
 ln(cmm) + (1  ) ln(hm) (24)
subject to
cmm + c
m
f = wm(1  z) + wf lmf   qdm; (BC)
hm = A(dm)(1  lmf + z)1 ; (HPT)
and
U sf (wf )   ln(cmf ) + (1  ) ln(hm): (WPC)
The rst order condition for the womans consumption good is
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wm(1  z) + wf lmf   qdm   cmf
= 

cmf
;
which becomes
1
wm(1  z) + wf lmf   qdm   cmf
= 
1
cmf
: (R1)
Derivating with respect to the womans labor supply we get
wf
wm(1  z) + wf lmf   qdm   cmf
  (1  )(1  )
(1  lmf + z)
= 
(1  )(1  )
(1  lmf + z)
;
which can be written as
wf (1  lmf + z)  (1  )(1  )(wm(1  z) + wf lmf   qdm   cmf )
(wm(1  z) + wf lmf   qdm   cmf )
= (1 )(1 ):
(R2)
Lastly, derivating with respect to the amount of durables we get
q
wm(1  z) + wf lmf   qdm   cmf
  (1  )
dm
= 
(1  )
dm
;
which can be written as
qdm   (1  )(wm(1  z) + wf lmf   qdm   cmf )
(wm(1  z) + wf lmf   qdm   cmf )
= (1  ): (R3)
The solution is
dm =
(1  )(wf + wm)
q
+ z
(1  )(wf   wm)
q
; (25)
lmf = (1 + z)(+ (1  ))  (1  z)(1  )(1  )
wm
wf
: (26)
We then perform the numerical example of Subsection 3.8 for di¤erent values
of z:
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Figure 6
For small values of z (left panel of Figure 6) the results are similar to the
ones we obtained when the man worked full time in the market. Note that the
number of cohabiting households has increased while the number of singles has
decreased. This happens because a man with a low salary can now convince a
woman with high salary to cohabit with him by o¤ering his housework.
However, the pattern of the optimal marital status changes drastically as z
takes higher values (central and right panel of Figure 6). Given the existence
of the gender wage gap in the labor market forcing the man to devote large
amount of his time to housework would give rise to non traditional marriages
(high salary woman with low salary man) as well as to rich males who remain sin-
gle. The interesting feature is that cohabitation entails again symmetric couples
(i.e. partners with similar wages).
5.3.2 The woman makes the take-it or leave-it o¤er to the man
In Section 3 we assumed that the man is the one who proposes marriage or
cohabitation to the woman upon meeting in the marriage market. We check
if our results are driven by this assumption and we examine the case that the
woman makes the o¤er. The problem of the optimal marriage proposal in the
2nd period becomes
max
cmm>0;0<l
m
f 1;dm>0
 ln(cmf ) + (1  ) ln(hm) (27)
subject to
cmm + c
m
f = wm + wf l
m
f   qdm; (BC)
hm = A(dm)(1  lmf )1 ; (HPT)
and
U sm(wm)   ln(cmm) + (1  ) ln(hm): (MPC)
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Note that the woman is now trying to maximize her utility by choosing the
hours she will work in the market and the amount of consumption good and
durable good she will o¤er to the man. We maintain the assumption that the
man works full time in the market. The woman has to take into account the
mans participation constraint in her decision i.e. she has to be able to convince
him to cohabit/get married to her.
The rst order conditions with respect to lmf and d
m are the same as in the
case that the man makes the o¤er. We obtain cmm from the mans participation
constraint which will bind (following the same reasoning as in Section 3) and
lastly we get cmf from the budget constraint. The woman will compare her
utility in singlehood, cohabitation, and marriage and decide whether making
or not a proposal to the man as well as the kind of the proposal (marriage or
cohabitation).
The numerical example yields exactly the same results. The only di¤erence
lies on the fact that the utility of the woman is higher in marriage or cohabita-
tion than in singlehood, while the utility of the man is always the same as his
participation constraint is binding. This mitigates the optimal marital status
that is obtained when the man makes the take-it or leave-it o¤er.
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